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Abstract
This paper reproduces Lucas’s analysis of the costs of business cycles in an economy with a low
probability, crash state in consumption growth. For reasonable parameter values, it is shown that
the presence of a crash state dramatically increases the costs of consumption volatility. Speciﬁcally,
for relative risk aversion around 5, households in the US economy would, in aggregate, pay over
$60 billion (approximately 3% of consumption in 2001) to eliminate consumption uncertainty. The
conclusion is that stabilization policy is important not for its eﬀects on second moments but in
reducing kurtosis by lowering both the probability and severity of a crash state.
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In an elegant and dramatic demonstration, Robert Lucas, Jr. (1987) argued that the welfare
costs of consumption volatility, as exhibited in post-war U.S. data, are extremely small
- for reasonable values of risk aversion, the typical household would pay much less than
one percent of their annual consumption to eliminate all volatility. This result clearly
posed a challenge to economists involved in stabilization policy analysis since the cost of the
paper and ink involved in such work, not to mention the conferences, likely exceeded the
potential beneﬁts to society. Not surprisingly, there were many responses to this challenge
and these were in large part motivated by the simple environment that Lucas used for his
demonstration. Notably, he assumed a representative agent with time-separable preferences.
Papers have been introduced that permit non-expected utility (Tallarini (2000)) while others
attempt to model the asymmetric distributional eﬀects on household consumption caused by
business cycle activity (Krussell and Smith (1999, 2002)). In his 2003 American Economic
Association Presidential Address (given sixteen years after his original demonstration), Lucas
(2003) reviews this literature and concludes, “I argue in the end that, based on what we
know now, it is unrealistic to hope for gains larger than a tenth of a percent from better
countercyclical policies.” (page 1).
In reaching this conclusion, Lucas points out that estimates of the costs of business
cycles are inextricably linked to analysis of the equity premium puzzle since, in both types
of analyses, the volatility of households’ (or investors’) marginal utility of consumption
1plays a critical role.1 It is not surprising, therefore, that modiﬁcations that helped to
resolve the equity premium puzzle (e.g. non-expected utility) were also used to study the
costs of consumption volatility. But in the list of modiﬁcations that Lucas surveys, one
proposed resolution to the equity premium puzzle is noticeably absent: the inclusion of a
low probability crash state. As shown in Rietz (1988), the presence of such a state can indeed
explain the equity premium puzzle (and the associated risk-free rate puzzle). Recently,
Barro (2005) extends the Rietz analysis and provides some empirical estimates of crash
state scenarios. As he states, “...I extend Rietz’s analysis and argue that it provides a
plausible resolution of the equity premium and related puzzles. Included in these other
puzzles are the low-risk free rate, the volatility of stock returns, and the low values of typical
macroeconometric estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption.”
(page 2) I demonstrate below that it can also dramatically increase the costs of business
cycles.
I ﬁrst quickly review Lucas’s example and then cast the analysis in a discrete-state setting
which includes a rare, catastrophic state. This discrete setting is then calibrated to match
post-war consumption data. For reasonable parameter values for risk aversion, I show that
the costs of business cycles are roughly ten times as large as that implied by Lucas’s analysis.
Using consumption data for 2001, these estimates imply that households would pay close to
$70 billion to eliminate consumption volatility, i.e. roughly 3% of aggregate consumption.
The conclusion is that the gains from stabilization policy are not seen in reducing the second
1 Of course, the covariance of investors’ marginal utility and returns is also critical for the equity premium.
2moments of consumption but lowering the probability and severity of crash states.
2 Lucas’s Analysis
Lucas asks the simple question: Suppose household’s current consumption path is growing
at the constant rate of µ. If uncertainty was introduced into this path, how much would
household’s have to be compensated to be indiﬀerent between the random and non-random
























where the innovation is assumed to be lognormally distributed with mean 0 and variance,
σ2. Lucas makes use of the result that, if lnzt ∼ N (µz,σ2
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Lucas estimates σ2 =( 0 .032)
2 (deﬁned by the standard deviation of the residual from
regressing log of annual per-capita real consumption on a time trend over the period 1947-
2001). Hence, we have the following estimates






Clearly, the costs of consumption uncertainty are quite small.
3 An Alternative Characterization
An alternative estimate of the costs of random consumption can be obtained by assuming
a discrete state process for consumption growth. Here, I employ a representation ﬁrst used
by Rietz (1988) in order to study the equity premium puzzle. Speciﬁcally, it assumed that
(gross) consumption growth follows the following discrete-state Markov process
4µt =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
µ1 =1+m + δ
µ2 =1+m − δ
µ3 = k(1 + m)
with transition probability matrix (where the entry in row i and column j represents the
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States 1 and 2 are normal growth rate states while, under the assumption that k<1, state
3 represents a “crash” state or catastrophic state; note that the crash state is assumed to have
no persistence. I examine below diﬀerent values for the severity of the crash (determined
by k) and the likelihood of a catastrophic state (denoted by p); for given values of these
parameters, the remaining parameters are chosen so that the mean, standard deviation, and
ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of µt match the data.
























1 − βµ1−γ (3)




















.G i v e n t h i s d e ﬁnition, the










As discussed in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), the assumption of CRRA preferences
implies that the value function can be written as separable in current utility and a function




Let wi = w(µi). Then the unknowns (w1,w 2,w 3) are the solution to the three equations








Once the values of wi have been determined, the unconditional expectation of lifetime
utility is computed using the unconditional probabilities associated with Π (determined by
the eigenvector associated with theeigenvalue of 1). Denoting this unconditional expectation




1 − βµ1−γ (7)
63 . 1 T h ec o s t so fb u s i n e s sc y c l e si nt h ec r a s hs t a t ee c o n o m y
To obtain quantitative estimates of the cost of business cycles in the crash state economy, I
calibrate the discrete state Markov process in the manner described in Mehra and Prescott
(1985). Namely, the parameters are chosen so that the mean, standard deviation and ﬁrst-
order autocorrelation of µt are broadly in line with that of annual US per-capita consumption
from 1948-2001.2 These moments are given in Table 2.








Since these three moments are insuﬃcient to determine the ﬁve parameters describing
the Markov process (π,p,m,v,k), I choose values for the severity of the crash state (k) and
the probability of the crash state (p) that are roughly in line with those used by Rietz. I
look at two cases: Economy 1 represents a 50% fall in normal consumption (k =0 .5) with
probability (p) of .001. Hence, this represents a truly catastrophic scenario (the drop in
consumption experienced in one year is equivalent to the fall in output during the ﬁrst
three years of the Depression) which occurs roughly once every 1000 years. In Economy 2,
2 In the data, the standard deviation of µt is 0.02 while the ﬁrst order autocorrelation is 0.3. I use the
ﬁgures reported in Table 2 so that the 3 state Markov model yields sensible parameter values (speciﬁcally
so that π < 1) for the two cases studied. A problem arises in that the assumed lack of persistence in the
crash state implies negative serial correlation in the process. To overcome this requires a high value of
π. The standard deviation in Mehra and Prescott’s analysis was 0.32 (using a much longer time series for
consumption) while they found consumption growth to be negatively autocorrelated. As mentioned earlier,
Lucas used an estimate of the volatility of consumption based on a trend stationary speciﬁcation of per-capita
consumption.
7consumption falls by 25% (k =0 .75) of its normal value and this state occurs just a bit less
than ﬁfteen times every 1000 years.3 The discount factor is held constant at β =0 .96 while
relative risk aversion takes on the values reported in Table 1, i.e. γ =( 1 .5,3.0,5.0,8.0).T h e
implied costs are presented in Table 3. For comparison, I also include the costs produced in
the discrete state economy with no crash state (i.e. p ≈ 0). That is, since the environment
is slightly diﬀerent than that studied by Lucas (1987), it is useful to establish that the costs
of business cycles are indeed small in the absence of a crash state.
Table 3: Costs of Consumption Volatility in Crash State Economies
γ Economy 1 Economy 2 No Crash State
1.5 0.0034 0.020 0.0030
3.0 0.017 0.031 0.0054
5.0 0.031 0.042 0.0059
8.0 0.116 0.065 0.0056
In 2001, aggregate consumption of nondurables and services in the U.S. was roughly $2
trillion (using chain-weighted year 2000 prices). Hence, for relative risk aversion in the range
of 3 to 5, the numbers in Table 3 imply that the presence of a crash state produces costs of
approximately $60 billion for the U.S. economy.
3 These parameter values are chosen primarily for illustrative purposes; clearly much more work needs to
be done in establishing estimates of the parameters k and p. Barro’s (2005) recent study of GDP for the
US and several developed and developing economies would support the values used in Case 2. Recently,
Thomas, et.al (2000) report that per-capita consumption fell by 34% during the recent ﬁnancial crisis in
Indonesia.
84D i s c u s s i o n
By comparing the values in Tables 1 and 3, it is clear that the presence of a crash state in con-
sumption signiﬁcantly increases the costs associated with consumption uncertainty relative
to an economy in which consumption has a symmetric distribution. One conclusion to draw
from this is that the modeling of policymakers preferences as the sum of squared deviations
from some target (whether inﬂation or full employment GDP) value, the common practice
in almost all applied policy analysis, may be misguided: As Lucas (1987) demonstrated and
reﬂected in the ﬁgures given in Table 1, these costs are insigniﬁcant. Instead, the results
here argue that reducing the likelihood and severity of tail events is a policy objective with
real welfare consequences.
Consider the welfare consequences in Economy 2 of reducing the probability of a crash
state from 0.015 to 0.0075 - that is, reducing the probability by half. The welfare gain in
terms of consumption (determined by the diﬀerence in the value of λ g i v e ni ne q . (7))i s
presented in Table 4:
Table 4: Welfare Gains in Economy 2





These marginal gains are fairly substantial relative to those presented in Table 1. Hence
9stabilization policy that focuses on the rare but catastrophic event would represent an im-
provement over current cyclical concerns.
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